The Contribution of the Economics of Information to Twentieth-Century Economics by Stiglitz, Joseph E.
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE ECONOMICS OF
INFORMATION TO TWENTIETH CENTURY ECONOMICS*
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ
In the field of economics, perhaps the most important break with the
past—one that leaves open huge areas for future work—lies in the economics of
information. It is now recognized that information is imperfect, obtaining informa-
tion can be costly, there are important asymmetries of information, and the extent
of infonnation asymmetries is affected by actions of firms and individuals. This
recognition deeply affects the understanding of wisdom inherited from the past,
such as the fundamental welfare theorem and some of the basic characterization of
a market economy, and provides explanations of economic and social phenomena
that otherwise would be hard to understand.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tbe century coming to a close has seen vast cbanges in
economics in botb ideas and methodology. Upon reflection, it is
remarkable, however, how many of tbe seeds of advances in this
century were sowed in the previous. I would argue that perhaps
the most important break witb tbe past—one that leaves open
huge areas for future work—lies in the economics of information.
The recognition that information is imperfect, that obtaining
information can be costly, that there are important asymmetries
of information, and tbat the extent of information asymmetries is
aflfected by actions of flrms and individuals, has had profound
implications for tbe wisdom inherited from the past, and bas
provided explanations of economic and social phenomena tbat
otherwise would be bard to understand. In tbis essay I wish to
argue that information economics has had—directly and indi-
rectly—a profound effect on bow we think about economics today.
Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century Antecedents
To be sure, Marshall and otber nineteenth century econo-
mists talked about problems of imperfect information. But witb
one exception, discussions of information were obiter dicta, cave-
ats at tbe end of tbe analysis; tbey were never at the center.
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Formal analyses focused on settings in which information was, for
all intents and purposes, perfect (or if not perfect, there was no
modeling of the process of information acquisition). In their
remarks, several of the great economists of the nineteenth (and
even earlier) centuries can be seen—from the vantage point
provided hy information economics—to have anticipated many of
its insights. Smith, Marshall, Weher, Sismondi, and MilP were
aware of information prohlems, even when they did not conceive of
them as such. For instance. Smith, in anticipating later discus-
sions of adverse selection, wrote that as firms raise interest rates,
the hest borrowers drop out of the market. If lenders knew
perfectly the risks associated with each borrower, this would
matter little; each borrower would be charged an appropriate risk
premium. It is because lenders do not know the risk properties
perfectly that this process of adverse selection has important
consequences. Marshall, too, anticipated the later efl&ciency wage
literature, in recognizing that paying workers higher wages may
increase their productivity. Implicitly, he recognized that workers
were frequently not paid on the basis of tasks performed. One of
the reasons for this is the inability to observe the tasks perfectly—
either the inputs or the outputs. In each case, the authors
observed the consequences of information imperfections and recog-
nized their importance, but they neither pursued the logical
implications (Marshall, indeed, suggested that it would "greatly
complicate" economic analysis) nor even traced the source of the
observation, the phenomenon, to a problem of information.
All of these early insights of the past masters into the
economics of information have been ferreted out of their writings
after the development of information economics. Mainstream
economic theory, embodied in the competitive general equilibrium
theory formalized by Arrow [1964] and Debreu [1959] ,2 simply
ignored these considerations. There was the hope conveyed by
Marshall's dictum, "Natura non facit saltum,"^ that so long as
1. See, for instance, Smith [1776], Marshall [1928], Weber [1925], Sismondi
[1814], and Mill [1848] as cited in Stiglitz [1987].
2. Debreu, in listing the key assumptions underlying his analysis, did not
even include the underlying information assumptions; they were essentially taken
for granted—Eind seemingly viewed as innocuous. Subsequent work extending
Debreu's work focused on generalizations of the mathematical assumptions—but
left untouched the underlying information assumptions.
3. Literally, "Nature does not make jumps"—this was the motto on the title
page of Principles of Economics and, curiously, it was also espoused by Charles
Darwin, pre-"punctuated equilibrium" (see Origin of Species, Ch. 14 and Gould
[1989]). Contrast this with Rosenstein-Rodan's [1984] use of the phrase "Naturafacit saltum."
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information was not too imperfect, economies with "almost per-
fect" information would look very much like economies with
perfect information, close enough that the idealized models would
suffice.
The Chicago School: Economics of Information as Just Another
Application of General Principles
There was also the hope that, as economic science progressed,
understanding of how individuals and firms devoted resources to
the acquisition of information would, and it would turn out that
the same optimality properties, the Fundamental Theorems of
Welfare Economics, that held for economies with perfect informa-
tion would hold for economies with imperfect information (once
one took these information costs into account). And it was hoped
that the same kinds of tools that had provided insights into other
branches of economics would work in the "economics of informa-
tion." Individuals and firms would equate the marginal benefits of
acquiring additional information to the marginal costs, thereby
tracing out demand curves for information. Stigler's [1961] contri-
bution on search theory showed how the calculations could be
done.4 (That search was costly meant, of course, that there could
be a price distribution. But Stigler did not take the next step, to
analyze the nature ofthe equilibrium that would emerge, a point
to which we will return later.)
Consider, for instance, one of the classic assumptions of
traditional economics, perfect capital markets. While there was a
general recognition that capital markets were not perfect, the
nature, explanations, and consequences ofthe imperfections were
far from clear. Stigler [1967], in his classic paper, provided a
frontal attack on the classic imperfect capital market hypothesis,
suggesting that many of the seeming imperfections could be
explained by transactions costs (including information costs), that
these costs were just as real as any other economic costs, implying
that, once these costs were taken into account, there was no
presumption that capital markets were inefficient.
Modern information economics turned these presumptions on
their head: even small information costs can have large conse-
quences, and many ofthe standard results—including the welfare
theorems—do not hold even when there are small imperfections of
4. A number of economists also used the framework provided by statistical
decision theory [Raiffa and Schlaifer 1969] to calculate the value of (or demand for)
information; see, for instance, Marschak [1971] and Hurwicz [I960].
1444 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
information. While one of the standard informal arguments for
decentralization using the price system is its "information
economy," information economics showed that, in general, efl&cient
decentralization through the price system, without extensive
government intervention, does not result in a constrained Pareto
optimum, that is, even taking into account the costs of information.
Information Imperfections and Alternative Critiques of the
Standard Paradigm
Underlying the Arrow-Debreu model were two other economic
assumptions (besides those concerning information):^ there was a
complete set of (state contingent) markets, and there were no
problems of enforcement. Much of the theoretical literature of the
last 50 years can be considered as exploring the consequences of
loosening these three sets of assumptions. While this essay
focuses on issues of information, it should be clear that these
diflferent strands are intimately related. For instance, there
cannot be markets in contingencies that have not yet been
conceived. More broadly, imperfections of knowledge (including
asymmetries of information) imply that markets and contracts
cannot be complete. (See Arrow [1974] and Radner [1968].)
Transactions costs [Williamson 1979] provide the major alterna-
tive explanation for incomplete contracts, but it seems plausible
that if information were perfect—if all contingencies could have
been anticipated—all important contingencies (at least where
there is the ability and desirability of transferring risk) would
have been taken care of in the original contract.
By the same token, if information were perfect, contract
enforcement would be a relatively simple matter and, more
broadly, incentive issues would not attain the importance that
they have in economics: individuals would be paid if and only if
they completed the agreed-upon task in the agreed-upon manner
in the agreed-upon time, and courts would be able to quickly
determine whether the contract had been fulfilled.
In the real world there is not the complete set of markets (and
5. There was a fourth important assumption—that competition was perfect.
The imperfections of competition that were stressed in the earlier literature
[Robinson 1933; Chamberlin 1933] had to do with nonconvexities in the production
technology. But even absent these, imperfections of information give rise to
imperfections in competition—again showing the important links between the
assumptions concerning information Eind the other key economic assumptions of
the standard model. Still other limitations on the "perfect market" ideal, such as
externalities, were emphasized by Pigou [1920].
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especially risk and future markets) envisaged by the Arrow-
Debreu model. In some cases, the consequences of this incomplete-
ness of contracts depends on the causes of the market failure; in
others, they do not. Lowering transactions costs in general may,
for instance, lead to a richer set of contracts if transactions costs
are the primary reason for the contract limitations.
As we have already noted, Stigler argued that the imperfec-
tions in capital markets can be traced to the transactions costs
associated with information. Modern information economics pro-
vided a number of alternative explanations, each of which may
have considerable validity in difFerent circumstances. These expla-
nations not only give a more cogent explanation of the detailed
nature of the market imperfections, but also a far less sanguine
perspective on the imperfections themselves.
Consider, for instance, securities markets. Equity markets do
a better job of risk sharing than do bond markets or loans. Yet
relatively little new capital is raised through equity, and few
countries have stock markets with diversified share ownership
(which would presumably do better at spreading risk). Why is
equity not more widely used? Information economics provides a
convincing set of explanations, at least for certain circumstances.^
In economies where companies'books cannot be well audited—
which includes most developing countries—the "costly state verifi-
cation model" provides a convincing explanation for the limited
use of equity.'' When insiders in a firm have more information
than outsiders—a not uncommon situation—then the controlling
insiders' willingness to issue equity conveys a (noisy) signal that
says that on average the shares are overpriced, and the market
responds by lowering the price (conversely when firms buy back
shares).^ This discourages firms from issuing new shares.
Once it is recognized, however, that for whatever reason firms
6. Tax considerations may play a role as well, but the issue arises even in
economies in which corporate and individual tax rates are low or in which they
cannot provide an explanation for the hias against equity.
7. For a discussion of the costly state verification literature, see, e.g.,
Townsend [1979] Eind Bemanke and Gertler [1989]. The discretion that managers
or controlling shareholders have to divert profits to their own benefit is one ofthe
key issues in corporate governance. See below.
8. The theory was developed by JVlyers and Majluf [1984] and Greenwald,
Stiglitz, and Weiss [1984], with empirical verification provided by Asquith and
Mullins [1986]. Also see other articles in the Journal of Financial Economics
Symposium of January-February 1986. Similar results obtain within simaline
models. See Ross [1977] and Stiglitz [1982b].
These two theories are not the only information-theoretic explanations ofthe
hmited use of equity. There are also incentive-based theories (sometimes referred
to as the backs-to-the-wall theories), e.g., of Jensen and Meckling [1976].
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have limited access to (or choose to make limited use of) equity—
that is, that the equity market is incomplete—then certain
consequences follow. Firms resort to borrowing to raise funds;
they may (and typically do) borrow enough that there is some
probability of bankruptcy. Issues of what happens when bank-
ruptcy occurs come to the fore—and determine in part how much
the firm is willing to borrow. If bankruptcy imposes a cost on
shareholders or managers, then firms will act in a risk-averse
manner (provided that they are not too near the bankruptcy
point)—explaining some of the seemingly anomalous behavior of
firms (see Section III below).^
Twentieth Century Antecedents
Mr. Jourdain exclaimed in Moliere's Bourgeois Gentilhomme,
"Good Heavens! For more than forty years I have been speaking
prose without knowing it.''^" So too for the early twentieth century
economists: Hayek pointed out that the standard competitive
equilibrium model could be viewed as solving a particular—and
extremely important—information problem, information about
scarcity. The decentralized price system led to the efficient
allocation of scarce resources. No one had to know the preferences
of all the individuals, or the technologies of all the firms, to ensure
that resource allocations were Pareto efficient. Prices conveyed
the relevant information. They were, in effect, sufficient statistics."
Even in this domain, Hayek did not try to model how the
economy processerf information. Until the development of informa-
tion economics, models in which economic systems bad to adjust to
new information were not formulated. ^ ^ The Arrow-Debreu model
solved, at date 0, the complete (state contingent) resource alloca-
tion problem.
9. When net worth becomes too low, firms may act in a risk-loving manner, a
point emphasized in the literature on hank regulation.
10. Jean Baptiste Moliere, Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, Act III, Scene 4, circa
1670.
11. This information-theoretic perspective on the price system was put
forward clearly by Hayek [1945]. But while arguing forcefully that the central
problem of economics—of designing an efBcient economic system—entailed finding
"the best way of utilizing knowledge initially dispersed among all the people"
[1945, p. 520], the information problem on which he focused was "how much more
or less difficult to procure [particular commodities] have become relative with
other things with which he is also concemed, or how much more or less urgently
wanted are the altemative things he produces or uses." [1945, p. 525].
12. This point was emphasized in Grossman and Stiglitz [1976, 1980]. Other
early papers modeling market economies that are continuously adapting to new
information include Grossman [1977] and Lucas [1975]. Arrow himself was aware
of these limitations, as he pointed out in his presidential address to the American
Economic Association [1974].
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Besides information about scarcity, there are many other
problems of information that arise in an economy. Employers
want to know the productivity of their workers, their strengths
and weaknesses; investors want to know the return on various
assets in which they might invest; insurance companies want to
know the likelihood that various people they insure might have an
accident or get sick. These are examples of selection problems,
where what is of concern are characteristics of the items being
transacted.
Employers also want to know bow bard tbeir workers work;
insurers wbat care tbeir insured take to avoid an accident; lenders
wbat risks tbeir borrowers take. Tbese are all examples of wbat
are called incentive (or moral hazard) problems, and tbey focus on
behavior.
And wbat is most impori;ant, as I discuss below, is tbat
because of tbese otber problems of information tbat arise in tbe
economy, prices do not in fact solve tbe information problem of
scarcity. Tbe excbange process is intertwined witb tbe process of
selection over bidden cbaracteristics and tbe process of providing
incentives for bidden bebaviors. As a result of tbe multiple roles
tbat prices play, employed workers may, for instance, receive bigb
wages wbile identical individuals are unemployed (tbe bigb wage
rations firm demand and serves as a selection or incentive device).
In tbis essay I focus on information about cbaracteristics and
bebavior, ratber tban about scarcity—because, I sball argue, of its
important implications. But tbe twentietb century bas also seen
important advances in our understanding of tbe economics of
information about scarcity. I briefly note two important sets of
contributions, botb dealing witb situations wbere conventional
competitive market mecbanisms do not work well. One focuses on
bow tbe government can induce individuals to reveal information
about tbeir preferences for public goods;i3 tbe otber on allocating,
for instance, a particular item to tbe individual wbo values it tbe
most tbrougb auction mecbanisms.i*
I do not intend to provide bere a complete bistory of tbe
development of information economics, but the contrast between
13. See, e.g., Groves and Ledyard [1977]. This gave rise to a huge literature on
designing mechanisms for information revelation.
14. Vickrey's [1962] fundamental contrihution also gave rise to a huge
literature on auctions. An important branch of this literature focused explicitly on
the consequences of differences in information about the item heing auctioned
among the participants in the auction process. For a survey of the auction
hterature, see Klemperer [1999].
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some of the earlier contributions and more recent work helps to
highlight how much thinking has changed. Schumpeter, like
Hayek, was an Austrian working outside the Anglo-American
tradition and focused on issues that today we think of as associ-
ated with information and knowledge. Both talked more in terms
of evolutionary models than static ones, of incentives provided by
markets to acquire new information and to make new discoveries.
While underlying Hayek's analysis was a presumption that this
process was efficient, or in some other ways socially desirable, no
formal argument was attempted.^^ Schumpeter, on the other
hand, was somewhat more skeptical about the desirability ofthe
social outcomes of the processes that he envisioned. Because his
characterization ofthe economy was markedly different from that
of Arrow and Debreu, there was no presumption that the welfare
properties (the invisible hand theorem) applied to Schumpeterian
competition. He also took for granted the limitations in capital
markets that underpinned much of his analysis. Today, we trace
some of those limitations to imperfections of information.
II. INFORMATION ECONOMICS AS AN INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION
The fundamental breakthrough in the economics of informa-
tion was the recognition that information was fundamentally
different from other "commodities." It possesses many of the
properties of a public good—its consumption is nonrivalrous, and
so, even if it is possible to exclude others from enjoying the
benefits of some piece of knowledge, it is socially inefficient to do
so; and it is often difficult to exclude individuals from enjoying the
benefits. The issue of appropriating the returns to investments in
information and knowledge is thus central. Moreover, each piece
of information is different from others. A piece of information
15. Indeed, more recent work has questioned the optimality of evolutionary
(including Schumpeterian) processes. The development of "evolutionary econom-
ics" is, I think, one of the more important unfinished legacies of the twentieth
century. The movement from equilibrium models, derived from physics, to
evolutionary, dynamic models, derived inore from biology and ecology, represents
an important change in modes of thinking. See, e,g,. Nelson and Winter [1982,
1990]. Early surveys ofthe evolutionary approach are van Damme [1987] and
Mailath [1992], For examples of evolutionary game theoretic literature, see
WeibuU [1996], Fudenberg and Levine [1998a, 1998b], Lane [1993a, 1993b],
Holland [1975], and Mirowski and Somefun [2000], For a discussion and conipan-
son with other methods of studying the evolution of behavior, see Aoki and
Feldman [1998], Another evolutionary paper that does not use game theory is
Arthur et al, [1996]. Schumpeterian competition has given rise to an equally rich
literature, and it appears that except under highly special circumstances, Schum-
peterian competition does not satisfy the usual optimality properties.
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cannot be purcbased like a cbair. An individual can look at a cbair
and asceri;ain its properties before purcbasing it. But if tbe seller
of information tells tbe information tbat be wisbes to sell to tbe
buyer (before be bas bougbt it), tbere is no reason tbat tbe
individual will pay for it. And wbile an individual may repeatedly
buy, say, tbe same product from some store, eacb piece of
information, by definition, bas to be diflFerent from otber pieces of
information (otberwise, it is not new information—tbe buyer
already knows tbe information). In tbis sense, markets for
information are inberently cbaracterized by imperfections of
information concerning wbat is being purchased; and mecba-
nisms like reputation—wbicb played no role at all in traditional
competitive tbeory—are central.
It is not only tbat tbe market for information is markedly
different from tbe market for apples or oranges or cbairs, but also
tbat information issues are interi;wined witb tbe production and
sale of traditional commodities. In traditional economics, prices
convey all tbe relevant information (between consumers euid
producers, say about tbe scarcity value of resources). We now
realize tbat tbere are a variety of otber ways in wbicb economi-
cally relevant information is conveyed, and tbat prices convey
information otber tban tbat about scarcity. Producers and consum-
ers realize tbat tbeir actions—botb individually and "collectively,"
e.g., tbrougb aggregate movements in prices and quantities—
convey information, and tbis aflfects actions, so tbat tbe simple
tbeory of consumer and producer bebavior does not describe tbe
bebavior of consumers or producers in several central aspects.
A demonstration of tbe practical policy importance of tbis
observation is tbe recent discussions about tbe reform of tbe
global financial arcbitecture: tbe only element of reform on wbicb
tbere is near universal agreement is tbe impori;ance of greater
revelation of information about aggregate sbort-term foreign debt
fiows and stocks, quantitative information tbat would simply be
irrelevant in tbe standard Arrow-Debreu model.
Tbe observations just made about tbe ways in wbicb informa-
tion and knowledge differ from conventional commodities are
general: tbey apply botb to new knowledge, about new products or
processes, as well as to information, say about tbe cbaracteristics
of a particular investment opportunity. Tbere bave developed in
tbe last 50 years two distinct brancbes of tbe subject—tbe
economics of innovation and invention, focusing on wbat is often
called knowledge, and tbe economics of information. Botb bave
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important implications for tbinking about economic bebavior. For
instance, Scbumpeterian competition, competition for new prod-
ucts and processes, is markedly different from tbe kind of price
competition described by tbe standard competitive model.^^ But
given tbe limited space of tbis essay, I sball focus on tbe two
central issues on wbicb tbe economics of information bas focused:
identifying cbaracteristics (tbe selection problem) and monitoring
bebavior (tbe incentive problem).
The Selection Problem
Wbat is now viewed as tbe earliest contribution to tbe
literature on "selection" was not actually coucbed in tbose terms.^'^
Mirrlees [1971] asked bow to design an income tax system to
maximize social welfare. If tbe government knew everyone's
ability, it sbould simply levy lump sum taxes on everyone. Tbere
would be no distortions. But tbe government does not know
anyone's ability; it can observe only, say, income, and base taxes on
tbat variable—from wbicb it can simultaneously make inferences
about individuals' abilities.
Tbe process by wbicb individuals reveal information about
tbemselves tbrougb tbe cboices tbat tbey make is today called
self-selection^^ [Rotbscbild and Stiglitz 1976]. Mirrlees'problem is
one of a large number of similar problems of one party (tbe
government, a monopolist) designing a set of self-selection con-
tracts (income tax scbedules, pricing scbedules) to maximize some
objective (social welfare, firm profit).^^ Wbile tbe matbematical
16. Under Schumpeterian competition, there is in general imperfect competi-
tion in the product market. Schumpeterian competition focuses on the trade-oifs
hetween dynamic incentives for innovation eind static inefficiency.
17. The purpose of this essay is not to provide a detailed historical account of
the development of the subject. Doing so is greatly complicated hy the fact that
several of the most important early contrihutions circulated in mimeographed
form for many years hefore publication (in sorne cases hecause several journals
rejected the articles hecause of their unconventional nature). Thus, there is little
correspondence hetween the date of puhlication and the date at which the research
occurred.
18. In fact, individuals do not actually have to know their characteristics; all
that is important is that individuals with different characteristics make different
choices. Differences in heliefs (knowledge ahout themselves) are one important
reason for differences in choices, hut far from the only one. The literature may thus
have put somewhat too much emphasis on asymmetries of information, as opposed
to simply limited information.
19. While the analyses have heen impressive in providing general character-
ization theorems (e.g., "interpretahle" Euler equations), they have heen less
successful in providing insights into general qualitative properties, and some of
these are not robust. For instance, one of the general results concerning the
optimal income tax is that the marginal tax rate on the highest income individual
is zero. While the political relevance of the result has always heen questioned, it
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results have drawn considerable attention, the literature has also
served to show the desirability of enriching the set of observables—
and in doing so, has given insights, say, into both taxation and
monopoly theory. For instance, if the government can observe
consumption of different commodities (and at different dates),
then presumably individuals should face not only an income tax
schedule but nonlinear commodity tax schedules. If the govern-
ment cannot observe trades among individuals, then the govern-
ment is restricted to imposing linear commodity taxes—but
presumably at different rates for different commodities. Ramsey's
[1927] classic tax paper can be recast as an investigation into
optimal taxation where the government is also unable to observe
income, and so cannot impose an income tax: stated in that way, it
becomes clear that it is of limited relevance for taxation in
developed economies.^"
Each of these results were recast in terms of Pareto optimal-
ity: given the information structure (what was observable), how
could one maximize the welfare of one type of individual, given
stipulated levels of others' welfare? Recast in that way, it can be
interpreted as well as the problem of a monopolist who seeks to
maximize profits for given reservation utilities of the consumers.
In the case of a discriminating monopoly, the theory could be used,
for instance, to explain random prices (e.g., sales),^! and commod-
ity bundling [Adams andYellen 1976].
The most diflScult—and in some sense, still not fully resolved—
issues arose in analyzing competitive (or perhaps better, "mar-
ket") equilibrium, in economies in which individuals have limited
information, and know that they have limited information, mak-
ing inferences based on available information. Akerlof's [1970]
famous paper on "lemons" represented the first attempt at a
partial equilibrium model, in which the market price affected the
quaUty of the good offered, and that affected demand (since
consumers rationally knew this). The resulting demand curve
looked markedly different from standard demand curves, and
turns out that the result is not even robust—it depends critically on the
assumption that the relative marginal productivities of different individuals are
independent of factor supplies.
20. For instance, with an optimal nonlinear consumption tax, with utility
functions that are separable between leisure and consumption, there should be no
diilerential taxation of commodities. More generally, the structure of optimal
commodity taxation differs markedly, depending on whether income is observable,
or whether nonlinear taxation is feasible.
21. See Salop [1977].
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Akerlof emphasized the possibility that there might in fact be
little or no trade in equilibrium.
But Akerlof ignored the desire of both some sellers and buyers
to acquire more information. They did not need to sit passively by
making inferences about quality from price.
The literature quickly developed into two strands, one focus-
ing on self-selection processes, the other on direct expenditures
(screening, verification, search^^) to obtain more information. In
the latter case, one of the key issues is the appropriability of
returns to either search or certification—^which determines in
large measure the incentives for search or certification. The most
striking result was the existence of dual (stable) equilibria, one of
which Pareto dominated the other.^ ^ In models in which individu-
als differ in their ability, there may exist a "pooling equilibrium" in
which no differentiation occurs. In such an equilibrium, even the
more capable are better off than in the equilibrium that screens
for high ability. When dual equilibria exist, more information, in
this case, more information screening, seems unambiguously to
lower welfare, a point to wbich we return later.
The self-selection literature at first seemed to bifurcate, one
branch focusing on signaling by the "informed" party of the
transaction (say, concerning his ability) [Spence 1974], the other
on screening by the uninformed party, using self-selection mecha-
nisms to sort [Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976]. Apart from some
minor technical differences,^ ^ however, the major distinction
appeared to be in the theory ofthe firm. In the Rothschild-Stiglitz
model, firms were profit maximizing g^ iyew the actions ofthe other
firms (i.e., they focused on Nash equilibria), but in the Spence
model, there was no similar clear objective for the education
authorities. There were simply a multiplicity of wage-education
schedules that would "separate" out individuals, so that individu-
als with higher ability would obtain more education, thus allow-
22. Historically, the search literature growing out of Stigler's seminal contri-
hution seemed to develop quite independently ofthe hroader screening literature.
In retrospect, it is clear that the two are in fact closely related: search is just the
process of "screening" firms for the essential characteristic of relevance—their
price.
23. See Stiglitz [1975]; also see Arrow [1973].
24. In particular, arising from Rothschild and Stiglitz employing a model with
two groups, Eind Spence having a continuum of types. As Riley [1975] suhsequently
pointed out, real difBculties are encountered in the analysis of market equilihrium
with a continuum of types. In some game theoretic formulations, signaling and
self-selection models are differentiated hy the order of moves, with the informed
party moving first in signaling models, and the uninformed in screening models.
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ing an employer to make an unambiguous inference about an
individual's ability on the basis of his level of education.
The self-selection/signaling literature has provided a new set
of lenses through which a wide variety of issues can be viewed. We
see hanks signaling their trustworthiness hy the size of their
edifices, guarantees signaling a firm's confidence in the quality of
its products, owner-managers of firms signaling their confidence
that the firm is not overvalued by restricting the number of their
own shares they sell. One of the key issues that firms today think
about is how a particular action will be interpreted. What
inferences will be made, for example, if a firm issues a different
kind of security than has previously been issued, or offers a
contract of a different design? The formal theory has little to say
about this "out of equilibrium" behavior, but the equilibrium
theories have been useful in illustrating the range of actions that
can convey relevant information.
Incentives and Moral Hazard
In his path-breaking Yrjo Jahnsson lectures. Arrow [1971]
delineated a second category of information problems: moral
hazard, which subsequently has come to be thought of as the
incentive problem. (Also see Arrow [1964].) He put the issue in the
context of insurance: if individuals are insured against a risk, they
have inadequate incentives to take actions to avoid the risk. If
information were perfect, then the insurance contract would
stipulate the actions that were to be taken, and there would be no
incentive problem. But actions are, at best, imperfectly observed.
Insured firms do require commercial buildings to have sprinklers
(which can be readily observed), but they cannot monitor a host of
other variables that might affect the likelihood of a fire, such as
how frequently people smoke on the premises.
Precisely the same issue arose in the context of sharecrop-
ping—an institutional arrangement for land tenancy that is still
prevalent in large parts of the world. The contract was "explained"
in terms of its risk-sharing properties. The question was, what
were its other consequences? Intuitively, it seemed that if workers
gave landlords 50 percent (or more) of their output, their efforts
would be attenuated. Cheung [1969], assuming a perfect informa-
tion model, argued otherwise: the tenancy contract (implicitly)
stipulated a level of effort. Stiglitz [1974] argued that the issue
was essentially one of information: if information were perfect,
then the optimal contract would be a wage contract (given that the
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landlord was typically far less risk averse than the workers). The
worker was given a share precisely to provide him incentives—
given that his effort could not be observed. Effort was attenuated
relative to a rental contract, but workers simply could not bear the
risk of a full rental contract.^ ^
In the same paper Stiglitz laid out the two principal ways of
addressing incentive issues—monitoring and incentive pay—and
argued that the same issues arise in modern corporations, a
theme that was developed simultaneously by Ross [1973] under
the principal-agent rubric. In the subsequent quarter-century a
vast literature has developed, exploring (highly restrictive) condi-
tions under which, for instance, the optimal pa3mient schedules
might take on particularly simple forms, e.g., linearity. Yet the
most profound influence has been in the recognition of the
pervasiveness of principal-agent problems, the myriad ways by
which people attempt to address them, and the relative benefits
and shortfalls of the various methods. They occur between owners
and managers and between managers and their subordinates,
between the electorate and their elected officials and between
elected officials and their bureaucracies.
Not surprisingly, one of the main insights in addressing these
incentive issues entailed broadened payment structures (includ-
ing subsidies) and combining them with monitoring. Incentive
contracts focused not just on output, but on output relative to
others (yardstick competition, "contests"^^), observing inputs so
far as possible and basing pay partly on those observations,
subsidizing inputs that were complements to effort (landlords
might want to subsidize fertilizer), and monitoring (regulating)
processes (e.g., technologies employed).
At the same time, it became clear that there were dangers in
focusing incentives on easily observable variables (e.g., in educa-
tion, on performance in reading and writing), because such
incentive structures would divert attention away from perhaps
more important but more difficult to measure outcomes, such as
cognitive skills. '^'
25. There might be other problems with rental contracts as well: the tenant
might not have capital to pay the rent at the beginning of the period, and there
might be enforcement problems otherwise.
26. See, e.g., Nalebuff and Stiglitz [1983].
27. See Hannaway [1992], Milgrom and Roberts [1992], Kohn [1993], and
Gibbons [1998].
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Toward Equilibrium Analysis
Much of the early hterature focused on one party (the
principal—the manager vis-a-vis the workers, the owners vis-
a-vis the managers) attempting to control, or perhaps hetter,
affect, the hehavior of the other in a desired way, or to extract
information ahout his characteristics. Stigler analyzed how, given
a price distrihution, individuals decide on how much to search.
But the other party does not simply react passively. Firms know
that it is costly for customers to search, and will exploit that.
Managers know that it is costly for shareholders to monitor them,
and exploit that. At this juncture, there is a far from complete
understanding of the full dynamic equilihrium, hut in certain
special situations, progress has heen significant.
The prohlem of equilihrium price distrihutions and search
has perhaps heen the most thoroughly studied. Diamond [1971]
showed that, contrary to Stigler's analysis, if everyone had even
arhitrarily small search costs, there need not he a price distrihu-
tion. In that case, the equilihrium price would he the monopoly
price: the welfare losses associated with imperfections in search
costs in equilibrium were completely out of proportion to the
magnitude of the search costs themselves. Suhsequent work
showed that if individuals differed in their search costs (or, in the
lahor market, in the lahor turnover costs), then there would he an
equilihrium price distrihution [Stiglitz 1985a; Salop and Stiglitz
1977, 1982; Varian 1980]. These results were important in two
respects. First, they showed that even small departures from, the
standard model—an epsilon search cost—could dramatically
change the nature of the market equilibrium. The Arrow-Debreu
model was far from robust. And second, they refuted the long-
standing presumption that not everyone had to be well informed
for markets to work well—that as long as some, or enough,
individuals were well informed, they would "arbitrage"the market.
The matter could he put another way. Once it hecame
recognized that what people knew was endogenous, it also hecame
clear that what they did not know was also endogenous. That is,
the market and market participants might actually create noise—
forcing other market participaints to spend valuahle resources at
least partially to undo this artificially created noise. For instance,
managers' differential information over outsiders is a major
source of their rents; Edlin emd Stiglitz [1995] ^ ^ argued not only
28. Building on related work of Shleifer and Vishny [1988,1989].
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that managers recognize this, but that they take actions to
increase the asymmetries of information. Similarly, if all other
firms were charging the same price or paying the same wage, it
might pay the last firm to charge a diflPerent price or pay a
different wage; equilibrium would thus be characterized by a price
or wage distribution—inducing some market participants to
spend scarce resources to search for the lowest price stores or
highest wage firms.^^
These examples show forcefully that only with the construc-
tion of equilibrium models can one fully confront the inadequacies
of the Arrow-Debreu model and its core theorems on existence,
optimality, and decentralization.
Overturning Standard Wisdom
Embedded in the question, what do we know today that
Marshall (and others) did not know at the turn of the century, is
another question: what did they think they knew that we no
longer think is true? There are several dicta that, if not reversed,
have become highly qualified.^ "
Take, for example, Marshall's famous dictum referred to
earlier concerning nature abhorring discontinuities: "Natura non
facit saltum." Within information economics, discontinuities
abound. A particular observation may change beliefs in a discrete
way. This is especially true since many observations are of
discrete actions: an individual purchases insurance policy A or B,
and on the basis of that purchase, beliefs change discontinuously.
Discontinuities, of course, arise whenever there are noncon-
vexities in the relevant sets; standard economic theory empha-
sized that "normally," given the importance of diminishing re-
turns, such nonconvexities do not arise. But information is
naturally associated with nonconvexities. The benefits of informa-
tion increase with the scale of its production (utilization). The
costs of acquiring information are "fixed" costs, and as information
becomes an increasingly important part of economic activity, fixed
costs would thus appear to be playing an increasing role. In a
29. Salop [1977] also showed that it might pay a monopolist to use a price,
distribution to facilitate price discrimination.
30. Let me emphasize: many of the results (e.g., concerning the optimality of
the market equilibrium) have been overturned on other grounds as well. I began by
discussing two other important strands of modem research—incomplete markets
and contracts and imperfect enforcement. These too will undermine the standard
results (in ways that are quite analogous). But as we stressed earlier, information
imperfections provide a key part of the explanation for these limitations.
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quite different context, Radner and Stiglitz [1984] asked the
question, what is the relationship between the value of the
information and the expenditure involved in acquiring that
information? They showed that under a natural set of restrictions,
there was a fundamental nonconvexity in the value of informa-
tion. As a third example, Amott and Stiglitz [1988] showed that
indifference curves (in benefit-premium space) and opportunity
sets possess none of the usual convexity properties when there is
moral hazard. Hence, the mathematical restrictions that formed
the basis of so much of general equilibrium analysis (see Samuel-
son [1947] and Debreu [1959]), as plausible as they might be in
"normal" circumstances, seemed unconvincing when applied to
situations where information concerns were important.
Given discontinuous change in behaviors, the possible nonex-
istence of market equilibrium should perhaps not have come as a
surprise. Yet, the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium uncov-
ered in Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976] goes deeper. The paper
explored the extent to which market equilibrium would reveal
information about differences among individuals.^^ It showed that
(in a highly simplified model) there could not exist a pooling
equilibrium, in which the market failed to distinguish any informa-
tion, simply because (under fairly weak conditions) it would
always pay some firm to devise a way of inducing self-selection. At
the same time, it showed that there might not exist a separating
equilibrium (an equilibrium in which individuals reveal their
tjT e^s by their choices), because the costs of separating (in their
case, the limitations on insurance purchased) might be greater
than the benefits.
These were not the only results that were overturned. Per-
haps the most important results in conventional competitive
equilibrium theory are the fundamental theorems of welfare
economics, the formalization of Adam Smith's invisible hand
conjecture. Arrow [1978], building on work of Hirshleifer [1971],32
showed that in equilibrium there might be excessive incentives
for gathering information—a result with profound implications
31. And it was easy to show that under natural assumptions if there were a
continuum of types, there would never exist an equilibrium (see, e.g., Riley [1979]).
We remain skeptical about all of the proposed "resolutions" to our seeming
nonexistence paradox. See Rothschild and Stiglitz [1997].
32. Hirshleifer's essential insight was that some of the returns to acquiring
information (earlier than others) was rent acquisition; it did not actually result in
more eiEcient resource allocation. Arrow emphasized that the additional informa-
tion could reduce opportunities for risk sharing.
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for the so-called 'discovery function" of stock markets. Greenwald and
Stiglitz [1986] showed that the problems were more generic: whenever
information is imperfect or markets (including risk markets) are
incomplete—that is, essentially almost always—competitive markets
are not constrained Pareto efficient. Taking into account the costs of
improving information or creating markets, some individuals could, in
principle, he made hetter off without making anyone else worse off.^ ^
The essential intioition is that under these circumstances, actions give
rise to (pecxmiary) externalities, hut imUke the pecuniary externalities
in fuU competitive equilihrium models, these matter; they affect the
efficiency of markets. For instance, in insurance markets with moral
hazard, if individuals undertake risky actions (which cannot he
monitored), then the premium will he increased; it is in no one's
interest to expend the effort to exert greater care. Government
interventions—^in the form, say, of taxes or subsidies on commodities
that might lead to greater care—^will in general lead to Pareto
improvements.^*
These results, in tum, had profound implications for two weU-
estahHshed doctrines. First, they implied that the economy could not
he efficiently decentralized. Second, along with related results hy
Shapiro and StigKtz [1984], they established that the standard
separation of equity and efficiency did not hold when information was
imperfect.^ ^ Thus, hoth the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare
Economics and Coase's [1960] theorem (conjecture)^^ on the irrel-
evance of the distrihution of property rights, were overturned.
33. The paper was preceded and followed by several illustrating the result in
specific contexts, e.g., Stiglitz [1972, 1982a] and Newbery and Stiglitz [1984] for
economies with imperfect risk markets, Greenwald and Stiglitz [1988] for search
equilibrium markets, and Amott and Stiglitz [1990] for markets with moral
hazard.
34. This argument is somewhat more subtle than that sharecropping leads to
less effort than individuals would exert if they did not have to share 50 percent of
their output with their landlord. Such contracts can be Pareto efficient given the
information structure. Our point here is that there are interventions that are
welfare increasing, given the infonnation structure.
35. For example, in any given agency relationship, the distribution of wealth
affects the scope for screening (a richer person is better able to work for low wages
initially, contingent on a performance bonus once his high ability is revealed), the
scope for incentives (a richer person is better able to absorb losses or post
collateral, and so internalizes more of the consequences of his actions), and the
problem of incomplete contracts (a richer person is better able to post a bond—as a
kind of hostage—to mitigate the scope for opportunism). For a more extensive
discussion of this, see Hoff [1994].
36. It should be noted that Coase himself did not believe in this formulation
commonly attributed to him. There were other grounds for rejecting the hypoth-
eses that efficiency obtained, as long as property rights were well assigned, and
that distributional concerns were irrelevant, at least for efficiency, and possibly
even for the determination of the nature of outcomes themselves. See, e.g., Farrell
[1987].
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The new information economics had further profound implica-
tions for economists' Weltanschauung. In standard neoclassical eco-
nomics the deep properties^'' of an economy—preferences and technol-
ogy—determined outcomes. Not just distribution, but history and
institutions did not matter. But there are natural irreversibilities
associated with the creation of knowledge: history has to matter.^^
Indeed, economies with the same deep properties could have mark-
edly different equiUbria.^ ^ The new information economics not only
showed that institutions mattered, and helped explain why the
institutions arose and the forms they took,*° but showed why they
mattered. At the same time, it dispelled a growing misconception (not
unrelated to the Coase conjecture) that nonmarket institutions arose
to address market failures, and that in doing so, they restored the
efficiency of the economy. Amott and Stiglitz [1991] showed that, in
equilibrium, such nonmarket institutions could even exacerbate the
consequences of market failure—^partly because they do not directly
address the broader issue of information externalities.
It was not only the basic existence and welfare theorems
associated with competitive markets that information economics
overturned. So too were the basic characterization theorems of a
market economy with many firms. I have already called attention
to three such instances: the law of the single price (a market in
equilibrium is characterized by a single price) is clearly not true.
Even when there are many firms, each may face a downward
sloping demand curve for its product simply because of informa-
tion imperfections. Market equilibrium is thus better described by
models of monopolistic competition than by models of perfect
competition. And the law of competitive pricing—price equals
marginal cost—may also not be true, and not only as a result of
the imperfections of competition to which imperfections of informa-
tion give rise.'*^ In the presence of moral hazard problems, where
37. See Lucas and Prescott [1971] and Cooley and Prescott [1973] on
structural parameters.
38. There are, of course, other reasons that "history matters": any model with
irreversihilities exhihits this property. The point is that the acquisition of
information almost invariably is associated with such an irreversihility.
39. Apoint, of course, that Darwin [1859] had made forcefully upon his visit to
the different Galapagos Islands, which, with similar characteristics, possessed
markedly dififerent flora and fauna.
40. In a sense, Coase's [1937] work explaining the "firm" as an institution on
the basis of transactions costs can be thought of as a precursor of this work.
Another early example is Stiglitz's explanation of sharecropping discussed above.
41. Recall the remarkable result of Diamond [1971] that even arbitrarily
small search costs could lead not to just a small increase in prices—but an increase
to the full monopoly level.
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reputation mechanisms are required to induce "good" hehavior,
price must exceed marginal cost—there must he rents, costs to
losing one's reputation, if individuals and firms are to hehave well,
and thus it is necessary for price to exceed marginal cost in an
efficient market economy^ ^ [Shapiro 1983; Shapiro and Stiglitz
1984; Klein and Leffler 1981].
One of the great advances of the mid-twentieth century was
the enhanced understanding of how efficient markets operate; not
everyone had to he well informed for prices in an asset market to
reflect accurately the asset's true value. But not long after Fama
[1970] and others explicated the full implications of that hypothe-
sis (e.g., that it implied that stock prices move randomly),
Grossman and Stiglitz [1976, 1980] showed that if information is
costly, there must he an equilibrium amount of disequilibrium—
persistent discrepancies hetween prices and "fundamental val-
ues" that provide incentives for individuals to ohtain information.
The only information that could he "efficiently" distrihuted was
costless information.
Perhaps the most important result was to show that in
markets with imperfect information, demand could difFer from
supply in equilibrium. Lahor markets could he characterized hy
unemployment; credit markets hy credit rationing; neither were
phantasms. Once it hecame recognized that workers' productivity
depends on wages, e.g., hecause of efFects on incentives, lahor
turnover, or the quality of workers hired, it hecame clear that
firms might not lower wages, even when there were workers
willing to work at a lower wage, simply hecause doing so lowers
productivity so much that the cost of lahor would actually
increase. The efficiency wage hypothesis^^ thus provided an
explanation for persistent unemployment—and for small differ-
42. While showing that price must exceed marginal cost to elicit "good"
behavior, Shapiro [1983] also snows that there are circumstances (a large number
of potential entrants capable of producing a given quality that is offered in the
market) where the losses that a firm obtained before its reputation was established
would just offset the profits it obtained after establishing a reputation, so that over
the firm's entire life the present discounted value of rents would be zero.
43. The notion that productivity depends on wages (the efficiency wage
hypothesis) has a long history—dating at least back to Marshall's Principles of
Economics, as already notecl ["highly paid labour is generally efficient and
therefore not dear labour; a fact which though it is more full of hope for the future
of the human race than any other that is known to us, will be found to exercise a
very complicating infiuence on the theory of distribution"]. Earlier discussions
(e.g., Leibenstein [1957]) focused on nutritional effects. Information economics
showed how such arguments also applied to more developed countries. More recent
discussions have focused on morale effects (e.g., in Stiglitz's early discussion of
discrimination andAkerlof and Yellen [1986]).
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ences in productivity being translated into large differences in
wages (those with slightly higher productivity being selected into
those jobs in which efficiency wages were paid). Stiglitz and Weiss
[1981] and Keeton [1979] showed that similar reasoning could
explain credit rationing.
This list of standard results that have been overturned is not
meant to be exhaustive. But the point should be clear: much of
what economists believed—what they thought to be true on the
basis of research and analysis over almost a century—turned out
not to be robust to considerations of even slight imperfections of
information.
As the old saw has it, it isn't what you don't know that
matters so much, but what you know that isn't true! Information
economics has made us realize that much of standard economics is
based on foundations resting on quicksand.
III. APPLICATIONS
Information economics has had a wide variety of empirical
applications. Some of the work has tested particular implications
of the theory in particular contexts. For example, the prediction
noted earlier that as a result of "adverse signaling," when firms
issue new shares the share price falls, and when they buy back
shares the share price rises, has been confirmed by numerous
studies. One of the problems with testing the theory is that there
are ofben alternative bj^jotheses which are also consistent with
the conclusions. In the instance just cited, if securities are
imperfect substitutes for each other, each will face a downward
sloping demand curve, and, accordingly, an increase in the supply
(or even the announcement of a future increase in the supply) of
shares should lead to a fall in the price of shares. Thus, tests of the
information-theoretic hypotheses often rest on differentiating
responses on the basis of differences in information. The theory
predicts especially large price responses when (presumably in-
formed) insiders decide to sell their shares.
Similarly, information (screening and signaling models) ex-
plains why those who remain in school longer receive higher
salaries—but so do the standard human capital models and,
indeed, both undoubtedly play a role. But there are aspects of the
returns to education that seem consistent with the information-
theoretic perspectives and are hard (but not impossible) to
reconcile with the human capital perspective. For instance, that
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an individual graduates might seem to convey information—and
thus yield a return—that is beyond the increase in productivity
that is associated with the learning that occurs each year; and the
return to the fourth year of high school or college (graduation)
does appear significantly greater than the returns to previous
years. To be sure, it is possible that in the fourth year, all the
information that has been put into the student "gels" together and
finally makes sense; there is a nonconvexity to the production
process—but the information-theoretic explanations seem far
more plausible. By the same token, human capital theories would
suggest that the relevance of what the student studies to his
actual job should matter a great deal; in practice, it does not
seem to.'*^
The central concepts of moral hazard and adverse selection
have in a short span of years become standard in policy discus-
sions. A major criticism of the IMF bailouts in East Asia and
elsewhere in the recent global financial crisis focused on the
"moral hazard problem." The bailout, combined with the support
of exchange rates, attenuated incentives for lenders to engage in
due diligence in their lending and for borrowers to have adequate
cover for risks of exchange rate changes.
Both adverse selection and moral hazard were central in the
debates over health care reform that began in 1993—and the
paucity of empirical information on the magnitude of each played
an important role in some of the resulting policy impasses.
Consider, for instance, the debate about medical savings accounts
(MSAs). These were designed to encourage individuals to buy
insurance policies with larger deductibles and copayments, thereby
reducing the magnitude of the distortions arising from moral
hazard. But critics worried that those with lower probabilities of
needing medical care would more likely avail themselves of MSAs,
setting in motion a process of adverse selection. Those who chose
to buy policies with larger deductibles and copayments migbt
indeed face lower total medical costs, not because of improved
incentives, but because of the impetus that the MSAs provided for
"cream skimming."
In the following paragraphs, I discuss three specific issues
that have been extensively analyzed from the information-
theoretic perspective.
44. For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Weiss [1995].
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Sharecropping and the Theory of Rural Organization in
Developing Countries
One of the central aspects of less developed countries is that
markets work less efficiently, including "markets for information."
One would expect information problems to be more pervasive, and
their consequences more noticeable; and, indeed, over the past
fifteen years, an entire theory of rural organization, buttressed by
a wealth of empirical studies, has developed to help explain, on
the basis of information imperfections, a variety of institutions
and market imperfections widely observed in developing coun-
tries.*^ Earlier, we referred to the alternative explanations of
sharecropping. One of the clear implications of the information-
theoretic models (as opposed to those, such as Cheung's, that
emphasized risk sharing with good monitoring) is that productiv-
ity on land under share tenancy should be lower. By contrast,
under the assumption of perfect monitoring, not only should
output per (quality adjusted) acre be the same, but so should
inputs. Empirical studies have confirmed the information-
theoretic models, with both inputs and outputs markedly different
across tenancy arrangements (and in the ways predicted by the
theory).*^
Other aspects of behavior within the rural sector of develop-
ing countries that can be explained by information-theoretic
models include the interlinkage of transactions in labor, credit,
and land markets and numerous features of credit markets, most
particularly, the success of micro-credit schemes based on peer-
monitoring.*''
Capital Constraints and the Theory ofthe Firm
Earlier, we noted that information economics can be used to
explain credit rationing and the limitations in the use of equity
finance. Empirical research [Mayer 1990] confirms the relative
unimportance of equity as a source of new finance for firms, even
in countries with seemingly developed capital markets.*^
45. For a more extensive discussion see the papers collected together in Hoff,
Braverman, and Stiglitz [1993] and the literature cited there.
46. See, for instance, Shaban [1987] who concludes his careful econometric
study with the conclusion that "the sizeable differences that are found in the case
of sharecroppers are caused by the form of contractual arrangements . . ."
47. The theory of peer monitoring is developed in Arnott and Stiglitz [1991].
There has now developed an extensive empirical literature; see, e.g., Morduch
[1998], Pitt and Khandker [1998a, 1998b], and Zaman [1998].
48. As always, there may be alternative explanations, e.g., preferential tax
treatment of debt. However, that little new finance is raised by equity in countries
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Over the past two decades, a large body of theoretical and
empirical research has traced out the implications of these
financial market constraints for the behavior of firms, most
notably with respect to investment, but also with respect to other
decisions. In particular, with well-functioning capital markets,
risks will be widely diversified, so that firms will act in a
risk-neutral manner; but with financial market limitations, espe-
cially in equity markets, firms will act in a risk-averse manner.*^
The main thrust of this research has been to argue that invest-
ment will be affected by financial variables, such as firm cash fiow
and net worth, which in a standard neoclassical model would not
matter. In those models, only the returns to tbe investment
relative to the cost of capital matters.^" Note that even in Stigler's
interpretation of capital market imperfections, these financial
variables do not matter; transaction costs (including information
costs) affect only the true "cost of capital."
The challenge in the empirical research was to separate out
changes in financial variables from changes in either the cost of
capital or investment opportunities. Over tbe past decade, a large
number of clever ways by which this can be done have been
devised. (For a survey, see Hubbard [1998].) The studies identify
firms that are more likely to be credit constrained (e.g., small
firms, firms paying out low dividends, firms that do not have
access to the commercial paper market). The overwhelming
evidence is that for such firms, financial variables do matter. For
instance, adverse changes to cash fiow and net worth caused by
tax law changes^^ (that affect average but not marginal tax rates)
with markedly different tax structures, that the fraction raised by new equity does
not seem very sensitive to changes in tax laws, Eind that, in the United States, the
tax advantages of debt are limited (and in some periods, negative) as a result of the
preferential tax treatment of capital gains, suggest that tax considerations have
not been dominant.
49. When firms have to rely on debt finance, they face a probability of
bankruptcy. If there are significant costs of bankruptcy, if firms maximize expected
(present discounted) profits net of (expected) bankruptcy costs, they still will
normally act in a risk-averse manner—although if net worth becomes sufficiently
low, they may behave in a risk-loving manner. Principal-agent models of the firm
also can explain risk-averse behavior of the firm. See Greenwald and Stiglitz
[1990,1993].
50. See, for instance. Hall and Jorgenson [1967], which was based on
Modigliani and Miller's [1958] analysis showing that financial structure does not
matter under perfect information, so long as there are no bankruptcy costs.
Interestingly, empirical work prior to Modigliani and Miller strongly suggested the
importance of these financial variables. See Meyer and Kuh [1957]. It was
misguided theories, not the empirical evidence, that led to the omission of these
variables in the research of the next two decades.
51. A particularly telling experiment is that provided by the undistributed
profits tax of 1936-1937. See Calomiris and Hubbard [1990].
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or changes in the circumstances in other activities of the firm (e.g.,
in the profits from oil in firms that have nonoil-related activities'^)
do affect investment significantly.
The theory also predicts that the effect of these financial
variables differs across tj^es of investment, with investments in
R&D being particularly sensitive,'^ and investments in invento-
ries moving procyclically rather than countercyclically, as buffer-
stock models predict.^ * Empirical studies confirm these predic-
tions.^' Other aspects of firm behavior,^ ^ such as pricing decisions,
will also be affected. For instance, Greenwald and Stiglitz [1989]
show how risk-averse behavior can explain wage and price
rigidities.^'' Phelps and Winter's [1970] prediction that capital-
constrained firms will invest less in increasing market share
when facing financial constraints—leading to higher markups—
has been confirmed by Chevalier and Scharfstein [1995,1996] .^ ^
52. See Lamont [1997].
53. By contrast, neoclassical theory suggests that long-term investments
should be particularly insensitive to changes in short-term interest rates. The high
sensitivity of R&D to financial variahles appears even for industries like automo-
biles where one might have hypothesized relatively good access to capital. See
Greenwald, Salinger, and Stiglitz [1990] and Hall [1992].
54. In the standard theory, the opportunity cost of resources (underemployed
workers and machines) is low in a recession, so that unless storage costs are very
high, it pays firms to smooth production, putting goods into inventory in
downturns and taking them out of inventory in upturns. In cash-constrained firms,
the depletion of inventories is a relatively low cost way of obtaining needed
liquidity.
55. While for some types of inventories, e.g., those directly associated with
sales £ind production, procyclicality would have been anticipated, the procyclical
nature of inventories is more general. See, for instance. Carpenter, Fazzari, and
Petersen [1994] and the studies cited in Hubbard [1998]. Kashyap, Lamont, and
Stein [1994] show that inventory behavior of firms facing liquidity constraints
differs in the predicted way from those that do not. For a broader discussion of
inventory behavior, see Blinder and Maccini [1991].
56. Still another aspect of firm behavior that is consistent with imperfect
information models is the high level of retentions associated with windfall gains,
although there are alternative specific structures that are in accord with the
observations. See Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer [1994] and Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen [1988a].
A variety of studies have analyzed how financial constraints should afifect firm
employment policies (e.g., decisions concerning hours, layoffs, and new hires), and
these predictions have been broadly confirmed. See, e.g., Greenwald and Stiglitz
[1987,1995].
57. They show, in particular, that it provides a better explanation of several
aspects of wage and price rigidities than do alternative theories such as menu-cost
theories [Mankiw 1985; Akerlof and Yellen 1985]. Other information-theoretic
models (using search theoiy) have provided alternative explanations of wage and
price rigidities, an alternative explanation of kinks in demand Eind supply curve to
that provided by industrial organization theories based on asymmetries in
responses to competitors' increasing and decreasing prices. See, e.g., Stiglitz
[1987b].
58. Similarly, changes in a firm's liquidity position, as a result of, say, a
leveraged buyout, lead to increased markups. See Philhps [1995].
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That firms are financially constrained, and that those finan-
cial constraints aflfect firm behavior, has, in turn, important policy
implications. Average tax rates, not just marginal tax rates, aflfect
firm behavior, as predicted by the theory [Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen 1988b]. Contractionary monetary policy has dispropor-
tionately large eflfects on financially constrained firms, with the
magnitudes of the effects greater than can be explained by
changes in interest rates alone.^ ^ In the recent East Asia crisis,
there is considerable evidence that high interest rates had large
impacts on firm supply, explaining in part why exports did not
respond to the marked depreciations in the exchange rate to the
extent predicted.^"
Governance
The recent global crisis also brought to the fore concerns
about transparency—another name for information. Lack of trans-
parency was blamed not only for misleading investors into putting
excessive funds into the region, but also for the subsequent flight
of funds from the region. Lack of information implied that
investors could not discriminate effectively among borrowers, and
so rationed credit to all.^ ^ Although subsequent research sug-
gested that the motivations for these charges may not, them-
selves, have been totally transparent and that transparency was
not the main source of the problem,^ ^ tbe public discussion did
focus attention more broadly on issues of governance and informa-
tion. Here, I have time only to consider corporate governance.
Marshall, in his 1897 retrospective on economics at the end of
59. There is a large theoretical and empirical literature on the credit
availability channel for monetary policy. See, e.g., Wojnilower [1980], Blinder and
Stiglitz [1983], Gertler and Hubbard [1988], King and Levine [1993], Gertler and
Gilchrist [1994], Bernanke and Gertler [1995], Gilchrist and Zakrajsek [1995],
Oliner and Rudebusch [1996], and Kashyap and Stein [2000]. That many firms are
not credit constrained, and that such firms are affected by interest rate and
exchange rate changes, is not inconsistent with the view that credit availability
itself has, at times, a direct impact, especially since the effects of monetary policy
are often concentrated in those parts of the economy that face financial constraints.
60. See World Bank [1998,1999].
61. Note that apparently many, if not most, of the creditors refused to roll over
loans at any interest rate—that is, there appeared to be credit rationing. There
were simply not discussions about the interest rate at which funds would be
extended.
62. Some suggested that there were political motivations for these allega-
tions—to shift blame from the creditors who seemed, in some cases at least, not to
have exercised due diligence, to the debtors, and from the international agencies
who had pushed premature capital account liberalization to the developing
countries. See, for instance, Rodrik and Velasco [1999] and Furman and Stiglitz.
[1999].
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the last century, focused on corporate governance as one of the
main "unexplained" issues to be addressed by economists in the
next century. In what is sometimes called the "engineering
economics" of the first two-thirds of this century, all firms did was
(to paraphrase Joan Robinson's description) to look up in the book
of blueprints the technology (and other actions) that maximized
market value. Managers were engineers—not really decision
makers trying to figure out, in the presence of highly imperfect
information, what actions were most likely to maximize the firm's
value (or their own welfare). Workers did not have to be moti-
vated—they agreed to perform certain actions in return for a
certain pay. All that makes life interesting and difficult was
omitted. Marshall intuitively recognized that there was some-
thing wrong with this story and, in particular, there was some-
thing different between decision making in a firm owned by a
single individual and that in a joint stock company. He would have
been aware of the numerous failures of joint stock companies over
the preceding two centuries in Europe. Marshall, too, intuitively
recognized the principal-agent problem—managers' interests and
shareholders' interests did not coincide. On the other hand,
Marshall's resolution of this quandary, that managers seemed to
be "well behaved" in spite of a seeming absence of explicit
incentives, attributed the success of the British corporation in no
small measure to a combination of British breeding and upbring-
ing. That explanation is hardly acceptable today.
While early in the century, Berle and Means [1933] height-
ened awareness of the problems arising from the separation of
ownership and control, it was only with the development of
information economics that clarity was brought to the range of
issues.^ ^ Lack of information and the economies of specialization
(themselves related to the nonconvexities associated with informa-
tion) force owners (shareholders) to delegate responsibility for
gathering information and making decisions to managers. But
that same lack of information gives managers discretion to act in
their own interests—as opposed to the interests of the sharehold-
ers. Managerial incentive schemes are designed to align interests,
but do so imperfectly. Other checks are provided by lenders, in
particular banks, and by the "market for managers" (takeovers).
But both of these have important limitations too.^ * Legal institu-
63. See, e.g., Stiglitz [1985b].
64. See, for instance, Grossman and Hart [1996]. The issue of corporate
governance can be viewed more broadly as embracing conflicts of interests among
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^—from reporting requirements to strong fraud laws to laws
to protect minority shareholders from the majority—are all
essential parts of a broad system of corporate governance that,
while it may result in outcomes that depart significantly from the
simple "ideals" of value-maximizing firms, works reasonably well
in the better performing industrial economies. Within these
economies, two alternative models are found: one in which
stakeholders other than shareholders have well-defined rights
(and obligations) and all residual control and income is vested in
shareholders, and the other "stakeholder" model in which out-
comes are determined as a result of a complex bargaining process.
In the United States, lenders (banks) are starkly demarcated from
shareholders, while in Japan and Germany, with various forms of
universal banks, the two are more mixed^®—raising the possibil-
ity of a closer congruence of interests, but also the possibility of
greater conflicts of interests. Both models have had their advo-
cates, with the weight of opinion shifting in favor of the universal
banks in Japan's heyday in the 1980s, and since then against it.
But while there is a debate about the preferable system of
corporate governance, there is little debate that weak corporate
governance can lead to real problems—the problems in the
economies in transition have been attributed in no small measure
to inadequacies in the legal infrastructure underlying corporate
governance, leading managers to have incentives directed more at
stripping assets and "tunneling" than in creating wealth.^''
rv. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Hayek was correct in arguing that the central problem of
economics was a problem of knowledge or information: "the
all the stakeholders of the firms, e.g., difFerent classes of providers of capital.
Issues of corporate governance are, of course, not solely related to problems of
information; incomplete contracts (which we have repeatedly noted are at least
partly due to imperfections of information) provide an important source of
managerial discretion; and the puhlic good nature of management—all sharehold-
ers henefit if the returns to the firm increase—provides an explanation for some of
the problems facing diverse share ownership.
65. See, for instance. La Porta et al. [1998].
66. See, for instance, Kester [1993].
67. See, for instance. Black, Kraakman, and Tarassova [2000], Aghion and
Blanchard [1996], Weiss and Nikitin [1998], World Bank [1996], and Dyck [2000].
A huge theoretical and empirical literature has developed over the past two
decades on the issues of corporate governance. In addition to the works already
cited, see, for instance, European Corporate Governance Network [1997], Ameri-
can Law Institute [1994], the Cadbury Commission [1992], Fama and Jensen
[1983], Jensen [1991], Macey [1998], Shleifer and Vishny [1997,1998], Williamson
[1985], and Zingales [1994].
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utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality" [1945,
p. 520]. But he, like so many ofthe nineteenth and early twentieth
century economists, focused too narrowly on the admittedly
central problem of information about scarcity And the main-
stream of economics focused on how the price system solved a
once-and-for-all resource allocation problem, not how, or how well,
the market system responded to a continual barrage of new
information. I have argued here that, beyond a wealth of specific
results, information economics has changed the way we think.
• The key question is one of dynamics: how the economy
adapts to new information, creates new knowledge, and
how that knowledge is disseminated, absorbed, and used
throughout the economy.
• There are many dimensions to knowledge and information
beyond scarcity—knowledge about new products and pro-
cesses; information about individual's abilities and perfor-
mance, or about the likely returns to diflferent securities.
• Information that is relevant to economic actors is conveyed
not just by prices, but by a host of other variables—
including actions of individuals and firms, and quantities
(e.g., inventories).
• The information that is conveyed by prices is not just
related to scarcity.
• Individuals and firms recognize both that prices convey
information other than about scarcity (e.g., about quality)
and that their own actions convey information to others.
This aflfects their behavior in a myriad of ways—but most
important for standard economic theory, their behavior in
many circumstances may not be well described by the
standard theory ofthe firm and household behavior.
• Correspondingly, many of the standard results do not, in
general, hold: the market economy is not in general con-
strained Pareto efficient; the distribution of income mat-
ters, e.g., for whether the economy is Pareto efficient, so
that issues of distribution and efficiency cannot be sepa-
rated; equilibrium may be characterized by supply differ-
ing from demand (e.g., credit rationing, unemployment).
Moreover, while much of conventional economics was devel-
oped under the hypothesis of convexity of production sets
and preferences (based on diminishing retums), nonconvexi-
ties are pervasive in information economics.
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• But information economics has gone beyond simply destroy-
ing old results; it has provided explanations for phenomena
and institutions for which the standard theory provides no
explanation—and in some cases are even hard to reconcile
with standard perfect information models.
• Market forces also create the incentive to make noise,
which induces price dispersions, or which induces manag-
ers to undertake activities that obfuscate information
(thereby increasing their own rents).
Let me emphasize a point I made in the introduction: many of
the results (such as the nonoptimality of the market equilibrium)
can be explained in other ways, e.g., as a result of incomplete
contracts or imperfect enforcement. Information economics is one
of several departures from the standard paradigm that have
provided important insights—views of the world that are, ironi-
cally, often more consonant with those of Marshall than with the
competitive equilibrium models that dominated economic theory
during much of this and the preceding century. But I would go
further: at least part of the force of these other limitations arises
from imperfections of information. If individuals could be paid on
the basis of piece rates—if output (including quality) could be
costlessly observed—then efficiency wage theory (regardless of
how derived) would no longer be of much concern. If all the
important contingencies could be foreseen, then even if contracts
were incomplete, the consequences would be far less serious.
These, and related, results of information economics show
forcefully that the long-standing hypothesis that economies with
imperfect information would be similar to economies with perfect
information—at least so long as the degree of information imper-
fection was not too large—has no theoretical basis. And the
analysis shows clearly that the economics of information cannot
be approached as just another special branch of economics, like
agriculture, where economists look at the special nature of the
supply and demand functions in the "information sector."
Some have worried that in departing from the ideal of perfect
information, a Pandora's box has been opened up. Since results
often seem to depend, so sensitively, on the particular information
assumptions employed, how are we to know what is the correct
model? But the standard models have themselves made a particu-
lar set of informational assumptions—that information is perfect,
or at least fixed—a set of informational assumptions which is
fundamentally indefensible. Equally importantly, information
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economics has shown that results using that particular assump-
tion themselves are far from robust.
The complexity of the subject has resulted in many of the
models being highly parameterized—using assumptions (like
quadratic or constant absolute risk aversion utility functions)
that, while mathematically tractable, are known to have proper-
ties that are inconsistent with observed behavior.
The information economics that has developed over the past
quarter of a century has provided a rich agenda for the next. Some
of the advances will be technical in nature, going beyond the
particular parameterizations, toward more general theories. Some
of the advances will entail arriving at a broader consensus
concerning what particular information assumptions are appropri-
ate in particular circumstances, hopefully based on more empiri-
cal research. Some of the advances will entail new applications,
showing the role that information considerations play in explain-
ing a broader array of institutions and behavior. Some will entail
an integration of economics with other social sciences—with
psychology, on, for instance, how individuals process information,
form expectations, and select among possible signals; and with
sociology, on, for instance, the creation of social knowledge and
signaling conventions. But perhaps the most important advances
will be in two areas in which only limited progress has been made
so far: on dynamics and on organizations, on how and how well
organizations and societies absorb new information, learn, adapt
their behavior, and even their structures; and how different
economic and organizational designs aflfect the ability to create,
transmit, absorb, and use knowledge and information.
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